When gRPC HTTP2 stack raised a header size exceeded error, it skipped parsing the rest of the HPACK frame. This caused any HPACK table mutations to also be skipped, resulting in a desynchronization of HPACK tables between sender and receiver. If leveraged, say, between a proxy and a backend, this could lead to requests from the proxy being interpreted as containing headers from different proxy clients - leading to an information leak that can be used for privilege escalation or data exfiltration. We recommend upgrading beyond the commit contained in https://github.com/grpc/grpc/pull/33005 https://github.com/grpc/grpc/pull/33005
oryginał ENCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:HGrpc
APPGrpc1.53.0 – 1.55.0 (bez)
Powiązane podatności
gRPC-Go: Authorization Bypass przez nieprawidłowy nagłówek HTTP/2 :path
Heap-based buffer overflow w Google gRPC — zapis poza granicami pamięci
Google gRPC — zapis poza granicami pamięci przez use-after-free w grpc_call_destroy
Zapis poza granicami bufora w Google gRPC (gpr_free)
Przepełnienie bufora sterty (heap buffer overflow) w Google gRPC — zapis poza granicami