The IRC5 family with UAS service enabled comes by default with credentials that can be found on publicly available manuals. ABB considers this a well documented functionality that helps customer set up however, out of our research, we found multiple production systems running these exact default credentials and consider thereby this an exposure that should be mitigated. Moreover, future deployments should consider that these defaults should be forbidden (user should be forced to change them).
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:HAbb Irb140
HWAbball versionsAbb Irb140 Firmware
OSAbball versionsAbb Irc5
HWAbball versionsAbb Irc5 Firmware
OSAbball versions
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