Missing hash/digest size and OID checks allow digests smaller than allowed when verifying ECDSA certificates, or smaller than is appropriate for the relevant key type, to be accepted by signature verification functions. This could lead to reduced security of ECDSA certificate-based authentication if the public CA key used is also known. This affects ECDSA/ECC verification when EdDSA or ML-DSA is also enabled.
Signature verification functions in WolfSSL do not properly check the hash size or OID identifier (CWE-295 — improper certificate verification). As a result, hashes with sizes smaller than permitted or inappropriate for a given key type may be accepted by the ECDSA signature verification mechanism. The issue appears only in configurations where EdDSA or ML-DSA support is enabled in addition to ECDSA/ECC.
An attacker who knows the CA's public key may potentially conduct an attack involving forging or accepting invalid ECDSA signatures, which reduces the security of certificate-based authentication.
Patches available from the vendor should be applied according to references — fix available in the WolfSSL repository as pull request #10131 (https://github.com/wolfSSL/wolfssl/pull/10131). It is recommended to update to a version containing this fix immediately after its release.
WolfSSL library — configurations with ECDSA/ECC verification enabled and simultaneously EdDSA or ML-DSA support; specific versions indicated in vendor references (pull request #10131 on GitHub).
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:L/SC:H/SI:L/SA:L/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:RedWolfssl
APPWolfssl3.12.0 – 5.9.1 (excl.)
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