CWE-506

@beproduct/nestjs-auth is a NestJS authentication module for BeProduct IDS (Identity Server) with OpenID Connect support. Between 2026-05-11 20:19 UTC and 22:56 UTC, an attacker used a compromised npm publish token to publish 18 malicious versions of `@beproduct/nestjs-auth` (0.1.2 through 0.1.19). The postinstall payload attempted to harvest npm tokens (from `~/.npmrc`); GitHub personal access tokens, OAuth tokens (`gho_*`), and Actions OIDC tokens; AWS credentials (from environment variables and `~/.aws/credentials`); HashiCorp Vault tokens; and other secrets present in environment variables. Version `0.1.20` is a clean republish from the original `0.1.1` source tree. Anyone who installed any version in the range `>=0.1.2 <=0.1.19` should remove the package and clean the npm cache; install the clean version; rotate every credential present in the install environment, including all npm publish tokens, all GitHub PATs and OAuth tokens, AWS access keys, HashiCorp Vault tokens, and any other secret that was in env vars or config files at install time; scan affected hosts for indicators of compromise and, if any are found, treat the host as compromised and reimage; and check committed repository history for unexpected additions in `.claude/` or `.vscode/` directories. The worm is known to commit `setup.mjs` + hook configs to PR branches via automated agent runtimes.

Trivy Vulnerability Scanner is a VS Code extension that helps find vulnerabilities. In Trivy VSCode Extension version 1.8.12, which was distributed via OpenVSX marketplace was compromised and contained malicious code designed to leverage local AI coding agent to collect and exfiltrate sensitive information. Users using the affected artifact are advised to immediately remove it and rotate environment secrets. The malicious artifact has been removed from the marketplace. No other affected artifacts have been identified.

Malicious code was discovered in the upstream tarballs of xz, starting with version 5.6.0. Through a series of complex obfuscations, the liblzma build process extracts a prebuilt object file from a disguised test file existing in the source code, which is then used to modify specific functions in the liblzma code. This results in a modified liblzma library that can be used by any software linked against this library, intercepting and modifying the data interaction with this library.

The internment crate 0.8.7 for Rust can trigger execution of malicious code when compiling a project that uses the crate, because it has a rogue dependency that registers with a command-and-control server to offer arbitrary code execution.

The append-only-vec crate 0.1.9 for Rust can trigger execution of malicious code when compiling a project that uses the crate, because it has a rogue dependency that registers with a command-and-control server to offer arbitrary code execution.

The arrayref crate 0.3.10 for Rust can trigger execution of malicious code when compiling a project that uses the crate, because it has a rogue dependency that registers with a command-and-control server to offer arbitrary code execution.

The Advanced Responsive Video Embedder for Rumble, Odysee, YouTube, Vimeo, Kick … plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authentication Bypass via a Hardcoded Backdoor in version 10.8.7. The vulnerability exists because the `_arve_uc_init()` function — registered on WordPress's `init` hook at priority 1 so that it runs before any authentication checks on every request — reads an attacker-supplied token from the `_wplogin` (or `_wpm`) parameter and compares it against a hardcoded SHA-256 hash embedded directly in the plugin source, with no nonce verification, no capability check, and no password validation anywhere in the flow. Because this static hash constitutes a set of universal credentials that are publicly accessible in the plugin's source code, unauthenticated attackers can supply the known token to be authenticated as an arbitrarily selected existing administrator account, gaining full administrative control over the affected WordPress site. This was likely introduced by an attacker who gained commit access to the developers account.

All plugins by Essentialplugin for WordPress are vulnerable to an injected backdoor in various versions. This is due to the plugin being sold to a malicious threat actor that embedded a backdoor in all of the plugin's they acquired. This makes it possible for the threat actor to maintain a persistent backdoor and inject spam into the affected sites.

Bruno is an open source IDE for exploring and testing APIs. Prior to 3.2.1, Bruno was affected by a supply chain attack involving compromised versions of the axios npm package, which introduced a hidden dependency deploying a cross-platform Remote Access Trojan (RAT). Users of @usebruno/cli who ran npm install between 00:21 UTC and ~03:30 UTC on March 31, 2026 may have been impacted. Upgrade to 3.2.1

The module npm-script-demo opened a connection to a command and control server. It has been removed from the npm registry.

Guardrails AI is a Python framework that helps build AI applications. On May 11, 2026 at approximately 6:00 PM Pacific, an attacker published a malicious version of `guardrails-ai` (0.10.1) to PyPI. Aany user who installed `guardrails-ai==0.10.1` from PyPI on May 11, 2026 may be affected. Security researchers identified the malicious package within approximately 2 hours of publication, and PyPI quarantined the repository. Based on our telemetry, Guardrails AI maintainers have observed no requests to Guardrails AI infrastructure originating from the malicious 0.10.1 version, and a review of system and access logs has produced no evidence of user data exfiltration through their systems. Users should upgrade to version 0.10.2 or downgrade to version 0.10.0, both of which are unaffected. Those who installed version 0.10.1 should rotate any credentials accessible from their machine (GitHub PATs, cloud provider keys, package registry tokens, API keys) and audit their GitHub account for unauthorized workflows or repositories.

On 2026-05-11, between approximately 19:20 and 19:26 UTC, 84 malicious versions across 42 @tanstack/* packages were published to the npm registry. The publishes were authenticated via the legitimate GitHub Actions OIDC trusted-publisher binding for TanStack/router, but the publish workflow itself was not modified. The attacker chained three known vulnerability classes — a pull_request_target "Pwn Request" misconfiguration, GitHub Actions cache poisoning across the fork↔base trust boundary, and runtime memory extraction of the OIDC token from the Actions runner process — to publish credential-stealing malware under a trusted identity. Each affected package received exactly two malicious versions, published a few minutes apart.

Malicious code was inserted into the Nx (build system) package and several related plugins. The tampered package was published to the npm software registry, via a supply-chain attack. Affected versions contain code that scans the file system, collects credentials, and posts them to GitHub as a repo under user's accounts.

Trivy is a security scanner. On March 19, 2026, a threat actor used compromised credentials to publish a malicious Trivy v0.69.4 release, force-push 76 of 77 version tags in `aquasecurity/trivy-action` to credential-stealing malware, and replace all 7 tags in `aquasecurity/setup-trivy` with malicious commits. This incident is a continuation of the supply chain attack that began in late February 2026. Following the initial disclosure on March 1, credential rotation was performed but was not atomic (not all credentials were revoked simultaneously). The attacker could have use a valid token to exfiltrate newly rotated secrets during the rotation window (which lasted a few days). This could have allowed the attacker to retain access and execute the March 19 attack. Affected components include the `aquasecurity/trivy` Go / Container image version 0.69.4, the `aquasecurity/trivy-action` GitHub Action versions 0.0.1 – 0.34.2 (76/77), and the`aquasecurity/setup-trivy` GitHub Action versions 0.2.0 – 0.2.6, prior to the recreation of 0.2.6 with a safe commit. Known safe versions include versions 0.69.2 and 0.69.3 of the Trivy binary, version 0.35.0 of trivy-action, and version 0.2.6 of setup-trivy. Additionally, take other mitigations to ensure the safety of secrets. If there is any possibility that a compromised version ran in one's environment, all secrets accessible to affected pipelines must be treated as exposed and rotated immediately. Check whether one's organization pulled or executed Trivy v0.69.4 from any source. Remove any affected artifacts immediately. Review all workflows using `aquasecurity/trivy-action` or `aquasecurity/setup-trivy`. Those who referenced a version tag rather than a full commit SHA should check workflow run logs from March 19–20, 2026 for signs of compromise. Look for repositories named `tpcp-docs` in one's GitHub organization. The presence of such a repository may indicate that the fallback exfiltration mechanism was triggered and secrets were successfully stolen. Pin GitHub Actions to full, immutable commit SHA hashes, don't use mutable version tags.

Zbtlink L3_V2_8 firmware 3.0.0.4.528, Zbtlink WE826-T2 firmware 19.1101, Zbtlink ZBT-7628 firmware 1.0.0.2.007, Zbtlink ZBT-ZBT7621 firmware 1.0.0.3.001, MoreQuick MQAC-7620, MQAC-7620A, MQAP-7620, MQAP-7620A, and MQAP-7628 firmware 1.0.0.2.000, AP522 firmware 1.0.0.2.014, AP7628 and HC5661A firmware 3.0.0.4.380, APG721B firmware 19.0809, HK300 firmware 1.0.0.2.032, and MAP-N10 firmware 1.0.0.2.044 ship a backdoor command-and-control implant (yunmgrd) reachable over an unauthenticated cleartext UDP channel to a hardcoded C2 server. A remote unauthenticated attacker on the network path can hijack the channel and execute arbitrary commands as root. The attacker can also modify DNS entries, exfiltrate PPPoE credentials, and open reverse SSH tunnels.

Fluent Forms Pro 6.2.7 contains an embedded malicious code vulnerability introduced via a tampered plugin build served through a decommissioned update server. The tampered build introduced a rogue PHP file (libs/class-license-sync.php), loaded via a require_once directive added to fluentformpro.php, that established a backdoor REST API endpoint, dropped persistent PHP files in mu-plugins and uploads directories, installed a passwordless administrator account, and registered scheduled tasks that survived plugin removal.

Ninja Tables Pro 5.2.11 contains an embedded malicious code vulnerability introduced via a tampered plugin build served through a decommissioned update server. The tampered build introduced a rogue PHP file (app/Library/updater/NinjaTableDataSync.php) that established a backdoor REST API endpoint, dropped persistent PHP files in mu-plugins and uploads directories, installed a passwordless administrator account, and registered scheduled tasks that survived plugin removal.

use-context-selector is a React useContextSelector hook in userland Between 2026-05-18 15:57:18 and 2026-05-19 15:24:34, the default branch contained malicious commits 9d8481a513b7b0d1c0941b220c69b25de748641b through 6f2dae054ca014068bdbbb4db96006424d674124 that executed remote attacker-controlled code on developer machines during `npm install`. The commits were removed by force-push, but local clones, forks, and direct-SHA URLs may still contain them, and `npm install` against an affected checkout will still execute the code today. The package was not published to npm. `src/install.js` was added and wired into the `postinstall` script. It fetched a JavaScript payload from an attacker-controlled HTTPS endpoint (configurable via an environment variable), disabled TLS verification, and evaluated the response as code with `require` available. Execution was deliberately skipped on CI and cloud/serverless environments, targeting developer workstations. The second-stage payload was attacker-hosted and cannot be reconstructed. Assume full compromise of anything reachable from a Node process with the user's permissions. Those who ran `npm install` against an affected checkout on a developer machine on or after 2026-05-18 15:57:18 should treat the machine as compromised, rotate every credential the machine could reach, audit account activity** since 2026-05-18 15:57:18, and clean local clones.

use-reducer-async is a React useReducer with async actions. Between 2026-05-18 16:29:52 and 2026-05-19 15:26:07, the default branch contained malicious commits da72edbde5705efcec6c62e0a3dcb73687b78dc8 through df07d5711458d8b46e11dd7afaaa21e88cafabfb that executed remote attacker-controlled code on developer machines during `npm install`. The commits were removed by force-push, but local clones, forks, and direct-SHA URLs may still contain them, and `npm install` against an affected checkout will still execute the code today. The package was not published to npm. `src/install.js` was added and wired into the `postinstall` script. It fetched a JavaScript payload from an attacker-controlled HTTPS endpoint (configurable via an environment variable), disabled TLS verification, and evaluated the response as code with `require` available. Execution was deliberately skipped on CI and cloud/serverless environments, targeting developer workstations. The second-stage payload was attacker-hosted and cannot be reconstructed. Assume full compromise of anything reachable from a Node process with the user's permissions. Those who ran `npm install` against an affected checkout on a developer machine on or after 2026-05-18 16:29:52 should treat the machine as compromised, rotate every credential the machine could reach, audit account activity since 2026-05-18 16:29:52, and clean local clones.

react-tracked provides state usage tracking with Proxies. Between 2026-05-18 19:26:36 and 2026-05-19 15:22:45, the default branch contained malicious commits 6978272a7d6ca02225cb747ea69f427512e33699 through 949f1a3d6bb1ff7d1a0dec892afd773e742627e8 that executed remote attacker-controlled code on developer machines during `npm install`. The commits were removed by force-push, but local clones, forks, and direct-SHA URLs may still contain them, and `npm install` against an affected checkout will still execute the code today. The package was not published to npm. `src/install.js` was added and wired into the `postinstall` script. It fetched a JavaScript payload from an attacker-controlled HTTPS endpoint (configurable via an environment variable), disabled TLS verification, and evaluated the response as code with `require` available. Execution was deliberately skipped on CI and cloud/serverless environments, targeting developer workstations. The second-stage payload was attacker-hosted and cannot be reconstructed. Assume full compromise of anything reachable from a Node process with the user's permissions. Those who ran `npm install` against an affected checkout on a developer machine on or after 2026-05-18 19:26:36 should treat the machine as compromised, rotate every credential the machine could reach, audit account activity** since 2026-05-18 19:26:36, and clean local clones.